In this section, I will share with you some of my thoughts on various aspects of psychology as they relate to the sniper.
These opinions are not necessarily representative of the consensus viewpoints in the sniper community, but rather my own personal opinions as developed from my knowledge of history and my personal experience. First, I intend to discuss the psychological impact of sniping on the enemy.
EFFECTS ON THE ENEMY
In warfare, there are few things more frustrating and demoralizing than facing an enemy who uses unseen weapons for which there are few (if any) effective countermeasures. Much has been written in the press on the topic of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), a favorite tool of the Iraqi insurgency.
IEDs are hard to spot, there are few effective countermeasures and they are very often lethal.
The past decade of war has also seen a rise in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), another type of weapon that is hard to detect and for which there are few effective countermeasures. The sniper fits neatly into this category.
IEDs and UAVs, however, are largely a result of a technological advantage exploited by one side over the other. The sniper is very different in this regard.
While today’s snipers do use advanced technology not available to the average combatant (high caliber and extremely accurate rifles, ballistic computers, advanced optics, for example), their chief advantage is not technological but tactical.
They employ tactics that are just the logical extension of common infantry tactics: they exploit cover and concealment; they employ the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship; they travel by land. But the sniper uses these common infantry tactics to such a high level, that they are particularly deadly.
To the enemy combatant (be it a uniformed armed service or an insurgent), to be preyed upon by a sniper is to face an enemy that uses similar weapons and tactics as you, but is deadlier than you. Being the prey of a sniper can totally demoralize a unit.
Not only does it reduce the individual combatant’s confidence in his or her own skills, but it forces them to question the efficacy of his or her leadership and reduces the combatant’s willingness to be exposed (some exposure is necessary to accomplish missions (for example, some exposure is necessary to dismount from an armored vehicle or leave a reinforced base to go on patrol).
To combat these tendencies, counter-sniper tactics are often brutal and out of proportion to the threat.
US Army sniper doctrine warns snipers that if they are captured by the enemy, they should not expect to receive treatment commensurate with the requirements under The Geneva Convention. This is obvious in cases where the sniper is acting against non-signatories to the convention.
But even in cases where the sniper is acting against uniformed forces that represent a signatory to the convention, units that have been subjected to protracted sniper actions may be so enraged, that they will often seek revenge on the sniper possibly through execution or torture, if captured.
Snipers have a significant impact on enemy morale, but they also have a favorable impact on morale for their own side.
EFFECTS ON ALLIES
When Carlos Hathcock (see the “Sniper History” section) was in Vietnam, he often wore a white feather in his boonie cap. When the VC and NVA posted bulletins calling for his death or capture, they often referred to him as “White Feather”.
The bounty on Hathcock’s head eventually reached $30,000 resulting in a large number of Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) snipers and other units dedicated to pursuing him. Some members of the US military took to wearing a white feather in their caps to serve as decoys and confuse their enemy.
They realized that the loss of Hathcock would be a tactical loss. Moreover, they realized that the loss of Hathcock would be a strategic and morale loss of immeasurable proportions.
Hathcock was, in a sense, the personification of their sense of tactical superiority. His ability to repeatedly engage in sniper duels with NVA snipers and come out victorious was a reflection of their sense of confidence.
His ability to continually infiltrate enemy-controlled territory and take out high-value enemy targets was a source of pride. Stories of the success of friendly units are a great boost to morale; simultaneously, stories of the loss of such friendly units can be devastating.
During the invasion of Iraq, I heard a story of an American M1 (a main battle tank), separated from its platoon during a dust storm, finding itself surrounded by Iraqi T-72s (the main battle tank of the Iraqi Army).
The details of the story varied with each retelling but the ending was the same: the M1 used its superior maneuverability and firepower to defeat the numerically superior enemy force and survived the encounter relatively unscathed.
Whether this incident actually occurred or not, I observed the glee with which my colleagues recounted it to others and the boost to morale it provided and this effect stuck in my mind.
It is through this lens that I read about the exploits of Vasily Zaytsev (see the “Sniper History” section). His diary tells the story of a three day sniper duel with a top German sniper during the Battle of Stalingrad. The German sniper turned out to be Major Konig, the head of the Wermacht’s sniper school.
There exist no German records of a Major Konig that was head of the Wermacht sniper school.
The two most plausible explanations for this discrepancy are that either the Soviet propaganda machine made the story up (or at least inflated the importance and rank of the defeated German sniper) or that the Wermacht erased any record of Major Konig in order to hide the devastating news of his defeat.
To my mind, the former is more likely; it is much easier to create a story or inflate the rank of a body buried under rubble than it is to erase any record of the existence of a supposed high ranking military official and instructor.
Either way, the German and Soviet forces were both noted for their extensive use of propaganda to bolster the morale of their own forces.
Apart from the kinship combatants feel with successful friendly units, there is another strong psychological effect the actions of friendly snipers have.
If a unit is operating in a dangerous area, knowing that a friendly sniper is watching over the area can provide a unit with the confidence to expose themselves as needed. In certain types of operations, it is necessary to expose yourself to successfully complete the mission.
In Iraq, the most common manner in which this mechanism played out was in counter-IED operations. Insurgents would deploy IEDs along major routes, inhibiting the movement of Coalition forces and making it much more difficult to conduct the sorts of operations required to establish stability and order.
The deployment of snipers along these routes not only provided a sense of safety to those Coalition forces (often times they might not even know there was a friendly sniper nearby) but provided Coalition commanders with a wellspring of highly detailed intelligence on how IEDs were being deployed, who was deploying them, during what hours they were being deployed and what methods were being used to conceal them. And, of course, the reduction in the numbers of insurgents who could delpoy IEDs was also a strategic benefit.
Insurgent cells were often small enough that the loss of several members was enough to make the cell ineffective. In Iraq, snipers were also deployed in a similar manner against insurgent mortar and rocket teams, sometimes to great effect.
During the negotiations that occurred at the end of the Battle of Fallujah in 2004, among the first demands of insurgent leaders was that Coalition forces withdraw their snipers from the city.
THE UNIQUE PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITION OF THE SNIPER
Most of the military is very hierarchical so that the tasks associated with each rank are only performed by that rank. For example, a platoon leader will know how to operate and clean each of the weapons employed by his or her platoon but it is rare that he or she will be an expert in these tasks.
It is the job of the private to be proficient in those tasks. Conversely, the private will be aware of the basic structure of mission planning, but it is the platoon leader’s job to be the expert in that domain.
During a mission, the scope of the responsibilities transfers as you would expect: the platoon leader will only rarely fire his or her weapon; it is the platoon leader’s job to command the platoon. The individual private will be aware of the orders given to the platoon, but the private’s job is to secure his or her sector with the tools assigned.
The sniper team operates much differently. Each member of the sniper team must have very detailed knowledge of the mission plan. Each member will be involved in the planning of a mission and in the technical operation of all the mission equipment.
Because sniper teams are so small, each member of a sniper team must be able to operate without direct supervision from their superiors, unlike how a conventional infantry platoon operates.
In a conventional unit, criticism usually flows downhill. In a sniper team, criticism must flow both ways. All members of the team must be capable of honestly assessing themselves and their teammates, and receiving the results of their teammates’ assessments.
The sniper team’s effectiveness derives from its ability to observe. To that end, the disciplined team will be constantly training itself to improve their skills of observation. The two most common tools are “KIMs games” (a backronym for “Keep In Mind”) and “observation exercises”.
In a KIMs game, team member A will gather a handful (perhaps 10) of small objects and place them on a table. These objects can be anything, but some common ones are coins, shell casings, scraps of paper with something written on them and various tools.
Team member B will be given a certain amount of time to view these objects and commit them to memory (note taking is not allowed). This part of the game will usually be conducted in the morning.
At the end of the workday, B will attempt to write down as many of the objects as B remembers along with as many details about the objects as possible. As B improves, the allotted time to memorize the objects will be decreased. Ideally, all members of a sniper team will play the roles of both A and B.
In observation exercises, various small objects non-native to the environment will be placed and hidden in an area. This area can be a patch of grass or the side of a berm, for example. The other members of the team will then draw a range sketch (similar to a range card) with as many of the objects as they could spot.
This can be done from a certain distance with the naked eye or from a greater distance with binoculars or a scope. The team member setting up the exercise will try to hide the objects in such a manner that exploits weaknesses in human scanning tendencies.
These exercises require not only the cognitive skills being exercised but a strong sense of introspection and self analysis . The only reliable way to improve at these tasks is to be honest with yourself.
This approach, again, is very different from how conventional military units operate. In conventional units, criticism of one’s performance comes only from one’s superiors and this results in a culture of hiding one’s faults and relying on one’s superiors to conduct additional training for the faults they notice.
The sniper cannot afford such psychological self-indulgence.
Carlos Hathcock once crawled close to a mile over the course of four days for the chance to shoot an NVA general.
This sort of mission is at the extreme end of the spectrum for snipers, but it demonstrates the sort of psychological traits common to snipers: patient, analytical, methodical, and detail oriented. During his exfiltration, Hathcock had to crawl out roughly the same distance.
He resisted the urge to run out even though he was being pursued by his enemy. Although he was terribly sleep deprived and under great stress, Hathcock displayed the ability to think critically and rationally. These are, perhaps, the most crucial components of the sniper’s mental toolkit.